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Idsty's itig tion Strtey
Against Direct Infringers
[By Kristina Groennings*]

n the fall of 2003, suing direct infringers may have been the only
recourse left to the recording industry.1 The industry faced a
long-term trend of a decrease in
2
sales, due largely to file-sharing.
The decline in album sales following the inception of Napster, from 1999
through 2002, had been the most dramatic in
the past 30 years. 3 CD sales were down from

trict court. 6 In a desperate move to address
the P2P epidemic, the recording industry filed
a first round of lawsuits against its own fans
7
in September 2003.
In December 2003, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Verizon
complicated the litigation process by prohibiting the RIAA from using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) subpoena pro-

"The decline in album sales
following the inception of Napster,
from 1999 through 2002, had been
the most dramatic in the past 30
years.
$13.2 billion in 2000 to $11.2 billion in 2003. 4
The industry's victory in Napster was fleeting,
as publicity over the issue increased awareness of peer-to-peer (P2P) technology and users flocked to decentralized networks like
Grokster and KaZaa, making it more difficult
to track P2P use. 5 And in April 2003, the RIAA
lost its case of contributory and vicarious infringement against Groskter in a California dis-

vision to compel Internet service providers
("ISPs") to disclose alleged infringers' identities. 8 Without the benefit of the DMCA's subpoena provision, the RIAA must file "John
Doe" suits using alleged offenders' numerical
IP addresses. 9 Moreover, Doe defendants
have made motions to quash subpoenas, raising First Amendment, privacy, personal jurisdiction and improper joinder claims." Finally,
in the most recent setback for the RIAA's liti-
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gation strategy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' affirmed the district court's decision in
Grokster that P2P networks Grokster and
Streamcast are not contributorily or vicariously
liable for users' direct infringement."
Despite the above obstacles, the RIAA
has proceeded, seemingly unfazed, in its litigation strategy.1 2 Its latest round of suits, in December 2004, targeted 754 more "Does." 13 This
Article analyzes the effectiveness of the
industry's litigation strategy against direct infringers. Part I discusses the costs and benefits
of the lawsuits, concluding that the benefits
outweigh the costs. Part II offers suggestions
for additional ways the recording industry can
increase the efficiency of its enforcement efforts.

1.
The Costs and Benefits of
Litigation against Individual FileSharers
Significant benefits to the music industry provide insight into its persistence. Litigation has decreased user activity on targeted illegal sites like KaZaa and increased public understanding of the illegality of file-sharing.
Universities have adopted internal enforcement
mechanisms and joint initiatives with legitimate
online music providers. Finally, the increasing
popularity of legal sites like iTunes and the initiation of litigation by other organizations like
the MPAA also resulted from the RIAA's efforts.
On the other hand, though lawsuits have
curbed activity on targeted networks like
Fasttrack, a recent study suggests that overall
file-sharing levels have been unaffected, as users are abandoning targeted networks for lesserknown, more sophisticated and secure P2P
networks. Moreover, the RIAA's strategy has

garnered resistance from civil rights organizations and caused the recording industry to fall
into disfavor with many Americans.

A.
Benefits of Direct Enforcement to the Recording Industry
The threat of a lawsuit will realistically
do little to deter hard-core pirates. However,
eliminating piracy altogether was never the
RIAA's goal. 14 Studies show that many P2P
15
users do respond to the threat of litigation.
Although reports on P2P activity vary in their
depictions of the litigation's overall effect on filesharing, all reports confirm that the RIAA's suits
caused an initial, and possibly lasting, decrease
in file-sharing on mainstream, targeted sites like
KaZaa. Some studies also show that litigation
deters those who casually download and those
who have not yet engaged in criminal activity.
The predominant impact of the RIAA's strategy, however, is evidenced in less direct consequences of litigation that will combat piracy in
the long term.

1. Direct Benefits of the
Lawsuits
As a result of the litigation, networks
targeted by the recording industry have shown
a dramatic decrease in user base, both in the
short and long term. The RIAA initially directed
subpoenas at users who allowed their computers to be supernodes on the Fasttrack network
used by sites like KaZaa and Morpheus. 6
Nielsen/NetRatings reflect immediate flight
from the network, including a fifteen percent
drop in P2P usage of KaZaa and Morpheus, just
one week after the RIAA announced suits against
individuals. 7 Use of KaZaa alone dropped a
total of forty-one percent from the end of June

"The threat of a lawsuit will
realistically do little to deter
hard-core pirates.
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2003 (pre-announcement of suits) through September 2003 (post-filing of initial round of
suits).1 8 Data compiled by P2P research company, Big Champagne, demonstrates that
KaZaa's user base continued to drop, from 5.6
million users in October 2003 to 3.8 million in
June 2004.19
Moreover, studies by the Pew Internet
Project, a non-profit organization never retained
by the RIAA, reflect that the effect of litigation
was not limited to targeted sites. Survey results show that the total number of individuals
sharing files online dropped from twenty-eight
percent in June 2003 to twenty-three percent
in February 2004.2 Thirty-eight percent of
those in the April survey also claimed that they
were downloading fewer files because of the
RIAA suits, up from twenty-seven percent before the end of 2003.21 Reports from the NPD
Internet Research Group and Nielsen/
22
NetRatings support these findings.

2. Indirect Benefits of the
Litigation Campaign
RIAA suits against individual users have
also had broader social effects that may serve
the industry's goals. The litigation campaign
has raised public consciousness about the illegality of downloading, has been a catalyst for
university deals with legitimate music sites, and
has helped spur the rise of legal sites such as
iTunes. In addition, other content owners currently pursuing litigation against direct infringers benefit from the RIAA's initiatives.

a.
Public Perception
of the Legality of FileSharing
Surveys demonstrate that the RIAA's
lawsuits have been successful in stigmatizing
downloading.2 3 In the fall of 2000, seventyeight percent of downloaders did not think that
saving music to their hard drives constituted
theft. As of April 2004, that number had
dropped to fifty-eight percent. 24 Between April
and October 2003, the number of teens who
stated that downloading is illegal increased from
27.5 to 43.1 percent.25 And, the number of
teens that viewed downloading as morally
wrong grew from one fifth in April 2003 to one
third in October 2003.26

b.
Piracy on University Campuses
In its efforts to address piracy on college campuses, the RIAA has used a combination of soft and hardcore tactics, both pressing
charges against student infringers, and working with universities to implement long-term
solutions. As a result of this two-pronged strategy, many universities started to administer
their own deterrent mechanisms, from creating copyright policies and methods for dealing
with copyright infringement to partnering with
legitimate music sites.
College campuses have been particularly fertile ground for illegal P2P use, as students with tight budgets in the prime musicconsuming age group enjoy access to highspeed network connections provided by colleges. 27 The RIAA has made efforts to educate
university leaders on file-sharing and urged
28
them to pass on information to students.
University-imposed repercussions for illegal
activity conducted using university networks
range from Internet disconnection to expulsion;
in combination with non-judicial efforts to address piracy on college campuses, the RIAA
took legal action against students in 2003.29
After the initiation of lawsuits, the percentage
of Internet users ages eighteen to twenty-nine
admitting to downloading music dropped from
30
fifty-two to twenty-eight percent.
In addition, colleges and universities
have drastically changed the ways that students
can access digital entertainment content.31 As
of fall 2004, Napster, MusicNet, Rhapsody, and
iTunes all negotiated deals with multiple universities.3 2 Negotiations with legitimate music
services, coupled with university-imposed disincentives for illegal P2P use, may work to reduce file-sharing among university students
immediately and ultimately to reduce illegal
downloading by encouraging respect for copyright at an early age.

c.
The Rise of Legitimate Options
While the RIAA believes that "litigation
is not a business strategy," legitimate business
33
models have been supported by the lawsuits.
When the illegal Napster was available, the cost
of downloading was zero and the cost of legal
music considerably greater at $17 per album.
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Now, due to the lawsuits, an illegal download
carries with it a risk of a $3000 fine, whereas
legitimate sites offer singles for only ninety-nine
cents.
Immediately following initiation of lawsuits, BuyMusic.com, the largest online store
for PC users, noted a thirty percent increase in
traffic on its site from September 6th to the
13th.34 As of April 2004, seventeen percent of
music downloaders claimed that they were using paid services, and over 11 million unique
Internet users had visited legitimate music sites,
including Musicmatch.com, Roxio, Inc. (the
new Napster), iTunes, Listen.com, Walmart, and
Liquid.com. 35 In addition, the percentage of
people who claim they would pay for legal
downloads is up from sixteen percent in 2003
36
to nineteen percent this year.

international suits by IFPI-affiliated organizations will be reciprocal. Only 45.1 percent of
American users download from other Americans, 40 so the prosecution of uploaders by affiliated organizations in other countries will
work to decrease the amount of copyrighted
content that individuals in the United States
can access on illegal sites. Therefore, by setting
an example of a litigation strategy against users
that other content owners may learn from or
emulate, the RIAA stands to indirectly increase
the deterrence of alleged infringers, without
expending additional resources of its own.

B.
Costs of direct enforcement
to the recording industry
While studies of P2P use all confirm that
there was an initial decrease in activity on RIAAtargeted sites like KaZaa and Morpheus after

"Surveys demonstrate that the
RIAA's lawsuits have been
successful
in
stigmatizing
downloading."
d.
Other Organizations Follow Suit
One of the most beneficial outcomes of
the RIAA's bold initiation of lawsuits for the
record industry is that it paved the way for other
content owners to do the same. If the recording industry's lawsuits against individuals had
no deterrent effect, it is unlikely that other content owners will pursue the same strategy. Yet
press reports indicate that 200 alleged offenders are being targeted in the MPAA's first round
of litigation. 37 The International Federation of
Phonographic Industries ("IFPI") had already
pursued suits against file-sharers in Germany,
Italy, and Denmark as of June 2004.38 The
broadcast industry is sure to follow in short
order.39 Moreover, because the same P2P networks that are being used to share music are
also being used to transmit movies, the benefits of MPAA and RIAA domestic litigation and
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the initiation of suits, studies simultaneously
show either a subsequent resurgence in filesharing on less visible networks, or that filesharing levels overall have not been affected by
litigation. In addition, reports indicate that in
response to the threat of litigation, users have
moved to less visible, more secure P2P networks
that employ technological measures to help
users avoid detection. Yet another inadvertent
effect of the RIAA's litigation strategy has been
its toll on the public image of record companies.

1. Effect on Overall, LongTerm P2P Activity
Though the Pew Internet Project reports
that the percentage of individuals who download music is still less than it was in the spring
of 2003,41 there has been a small resurgence in
file-sharing since the initiation of suits.42 An-
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other recent report by the University of California,
Riverside,
and
San
Diego
Supercomputer Center ("UC study") alleges
that, although litigation caused a decrease in
use of networks such as Fasttrack targeted by
the lawsuits, 43 overall file-sharing has remained
unchanged, as users of those sites have simply
migrated to more secure and anonymous filesharing systems. 44

2. Increased Sophistication of P2P Networks
When the RIAA started disseminating
notices to Fasttrack network users of the illegality of their activities via instant messaging
("IM"), the network changed IM default settings, which prevented the RIAA from sending
messages. While this measure may have served
only to stem RIAA threats, other technological
adaptations may stymie online enforcement
efforts altogether. Morpheus, KaZaa Lite, and
Shareaza now help users identify IP addresses
of companies looking for pirates.45 Morpheus
also allows users to connect to a site that links
them to public proxy servers that mask users'
IP numbers.4 6 Moreover, a program called
"Waste" encrypts instant messaging and con47
tent sharing networks of up to fifty users.

3. Public Image of the Recording Industry
Perhaps the greatest casualty in the war
on piracy has been the public's perception of
the music industry. Possible explanations for
the negative publicity include the following:
first, unpopular prosecutions -for instance, the
RIAA received extensive negative publicity for
suing a twelve year old who lived in a New York
housing project. 48 Second, the RIAA is fighting an Internet culture based on the freedom
of information, which makes it more difficult
for the industry to justify copyright enforcement to Internet users. 49 Finally, civil rights
organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American Civil Liberties Union and
Public Citizen have submitted amicus briefs on
behalf of Doe defendants and supported opposition to RIAA strategies.50

II.
Proposals to Increase the Efficiency of Enforcement

Despite the above costs, the RIAA continues to pursue its litigation strategy. Yet without the threat of litigation, it is likely that P2P
activity will at least remain at the level that it is
today. In addition, the lawsuits are helping to
change public attitudes and spur stakeholders
to implement long term solutions to file-sharing. However, as there appears to be no sign of
cease-fire, it would be advantageous for the industry to consider more efficient means of fighting this war.
There are many ways that the RIAA can
increase the efficiency of its enforcement strategy. These include: putting more resources into
anti-piracy technology, supporting federal intellectual property enforcement initiatives, improving the quality of legitimate options, and
altering its litigation strategy.

A.

Anti-Piracy Technology

The RIAA has attempted several technological solutions to the P2P problem, some
of which are more effective than others. The
most promising tactic to date may be "spoofing," whereby P2P networks are flooded with
decoy music files. The recording industry is
using companies like Overpeer to implement
this tactic, which sends more than twenty-five
billion spoofed songs per month on the
Fasttrack network." Considering that the average song takes up to three minutes to download, if the number of decoys is significant
enough, less committed users may think twice
about the time it could take them to find a quality copy of their favorite song. In addition to
spoofing, the RIAA should collaborate with the
MPAA to distribute technology for parents to
regulate file-sharing on home computers. The
MPAA is currently developing free software for
52
this purpose.

B.
Urge Federal Enforcement
Using the NET Act
The No Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act")
is an important tool at the federal government's
disposal, yet there have been no reported prosecutions of individual, smaller-scale P2P pirates
under the Act. Passed in 1997, the Act makes
willful copyright infringement a felony regardless of whether the infringer reaped actual financial gain. 53 This provision is key for P2P
enforcement, because under the Act, the gov-
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ernment can prosecute individuals that receive
"anything of value", including other copyrighted works, in exchange for copyrighted
materials.-' In August 2004, the Justice Department successfully prosecuted its first criminal
55
case against an organized P2P network. If
used more liberally to impose criminal charges
against individual P2P users, the NET Act could
be a powerful deterrent of individual copyright
infringement above and beyond the civil suits
currently being filed by the RIAA.

C.
Increase Attractiveness of Legitimate Options
While illegal file-sharing now carries
risks of direct liability for copyright infringement and is more time consuming as a result
of spoofing and other tactics, legal alternatives
still require improvement in several respects in
order to compete with illegal file-sharing. The
recording industry could consider the following options to make legal downloading more
attractive:
(1) License more of their products faster,
thereby increasing the amount of music available on legal sites. As of August 2004, the iTunes
Music Store had over one hundred million

sic more affordable for students. Some universities such as Pennsylvania State charge students a $160 fee per semester in addition to the
ninety-nine cent fee per download. 61 Moreover,
because no single legitimate site currently offers the quantity of music that illegal sites do,
students are more likely to take advantage of
an arrangement that offers access to multiple
legal sites.
(4) Facilitate compatibility of portable
digital music players with multiple legitimate
music sites. For instance, the iPod only plays
music purchased from iTunes. 61 By limiting
consumers to one service, users reluctant to
designate one source for all future music purchases may instead resort to P2P networks.

D.

Improve Educational Efforts

While the RIAA has been very vocal
about the effects of piracy on the record industry as a whole, citing statistics of decreased CD
sales, unemployment, and decreased artist compensation, the public needs more tangible examples of this reality. For example, a detailed
illustration of how illegal copies of lesser-known
artists' albums affect the artists' compensation
in relation to the costs of production, market-

"Perhaps the greatest casualty in
the war on piracy has been the
public's perception of the music
industry-'"
songs available.5 6 KaZaa offered ten times that
amount." Major artists such as Madonna and
the Red Hot Chili Peppers have also been reluctant to license single songs, instead forcing
users to purchase the whole album.5 8
(2) Increase public approval by giving
more to the artists. Apple receives over a third
of the revenues while contributing very little
resources to make digital music available on its
site. 59
(3) Renegotiate university licensing arrangements with legitimate sites to make mu-
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ing and distribution, might be more effective.62
The industry should also voice the long-term
effects of piracy and strive to further clarify
copyright law for the general public. It is just
as important to educate consumers on illegal
behavior as it is to clearly state what actions
consumers can legally take, such as making
copies for personal use.63

E.

Alter Litigation Strategy

Finally, there are two ways in which the
RIAA may increase the effectiveness of its cur-
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rent litigation strategy: by making its targets
less predictable and by increasing the penalty
for illegal file-sharing.
Currently, the RIAA lawsuits exclusively
target uploaders, particularly those who upload
approximately 1,000 songs or more.6 4 Filesharers can therefore evade the RIAA by uploading less than the target amount. The RIAA's
strategy would benefit from a less predictable
approach. The MPAA has employed this tactic
in its litigation strategy, as the first wave of suits
named seven alleged offenders who had only
6
shared one film.
In addition, recent case law suggests
that punitive damages may be available for
copyright owners who seek actual damages and
profits for willful and malicious infringement
as opposed to statutory damages. 66 However,
the deterrence rationale for punitive damages
may already be served in an increase of the
maximum statutory damage award from
$20,000 to $100,000.67

Il1.

Conclusion

The RIAA's litigation efforts against direct infringers have led to an initial decrease in
file-sharing on P2P networks, have prompted
universities to adopt copyright policies and initiate negotiations with legitimate sites, and have
increased the appeal of legitimate sites. In addition, album sales increased for the first time
in several years by 4.7 percent in the last quarter of 2003. In January 2004, sales showed a
10.4 percent increase since January of the previous year.68 Total sales in 2004 are predicted
to exceed those in the last two years, although
69
the rate of increase has slowed.
However, these gains have not come
without great costs. Studies call into question
the effectiveness of litigation on overall and long
term P2P activity. File-sharers are migrating to
more sophisticated P2P networks, making illegal downloading more difficult to detect. Furthermore, the recording industry has unquestionably suffered a major loss in the arena of
public perception.
Record companies realized the threat of
file-sharing late in the game and were forced to
play defense, seeking a swift response to the
problem. Many have criticized the RIAA for
not looking to other solutions first such as pur-

suing the online business model before resorting to litigation. Yet, just as it would be unrealistic to expect a shop owner to stand by while
his goods are being shoplifted, it seems unfair
to expect an entire industry to remain idle when
faced with a potentially fatal piracy problem.
In an ideal world, an understanding that filesharing is illegal, and the mere threat of legal
repercussions, would be sufficient to win the
war on piracy. In the real world, one would be
hard pressed to find an industry that would
limit itself to one response and not avail itself
of all possible solutions to such a problem.
Moreover, it takes time for an entire industry
to alter a distribution model that has been implemented for more than three decades.7"
The RIAA's litigation campaign therefore
provided an immediate answer to file-sharing
that is both defensible and effective on multiple fronts. Perhaps there are means by which
it can increase the effectiveness of its litigation
strategy and bolster its technological response
to file-sharing. In addition, it must propose new
initiatives to fight file-sharing in the long term.
To survive, it must answer the question of what
71
purpose the middleman should now serve.
Indeed, it may even have to compromise. The
recording industry cannot put an end to filesharing, but the faster it can adapt to this new
environment, the more quickly it can shift its
attention and resources from deterring file-sharing to establishing a presence in the online business community.
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